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 “DIRTY LITTLE SECRET” OR “UNTIDY QUILT”? 
 A CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGIC PROCESS LITERATURE 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This literature critique forms the starting point of a research project on the 
development of strategic capability within the context of the realities of the strategic 
process. We begin by addressing the definitions of strategic process and exploring 
its importance. We then examine the evolution of the domain, a selection of 
archetypes of the strategic process, as well as some “sense-making“ devices. The 
role of the strategist is discussed, and we also ask if strategy-making capability is an 
individual or organisational characteristic. In conclusion, we examine the implications 
for management practice, the strengths and weaknesses of the domain, and 
possibilities for further research. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘The strategy industry has a dirty little secret - it doesn’t have a theory of strategy 
creation. Without a theory of strategy creation, we are helpless to improve our 
capacity to strategise.’ In a characteristically provocative assessment, Hamel (1996: 
6) argues that while there has been enormous innovation around the content of 
strategy, there has been no corresponding innovation around the conduct of 
strategy. The assessment of others, however, is more generous. Research into the 
strategic process and strategic behaviour has had a rich intellectual tradition, and 
has attracted the attention of mathematicians and engineers whose interest is in 
logical decision making, of psychologists whose concern is with individual human 
behaviour, economists concerned with the maximisation of utility, and political 
scientists concerned with the workings of power. Ansoff (1987) points out that 
researchers have also chosen different subjects for study – governments, 
universities, and commercial firms, and that different theoretical perspectives have 
emerged from these efforts. Despite – or perhaps because of – its history as a multi-
disciplinary melting pot, the domain has not developed within a single, unified 
paradigm. Pettigrew et al (2002: 6) suggest that ‘perhaps the state of strategic 
process research is better understood using Foucault’s metaphor of a kaleidoscope 
with its implications of discrete fragments, falling into different patterns as the 
kaleidoscope is twisted at key cusps in the field’s development, and that in keeping 
with the inherent nature of the social sciences, knowledge seems to have 
accumulated more as a mosaic, or the patterning of an untidy quilt.’  
 
     We suggest that although there is still much to do, there are some basic patterns 
to what is known and what is not known, and an improving understanding of what 
works and what doesn’t. 
 
2. Strategy, strategic decision making, and the strategic process 
 
Perspectives of the strategic process are inevitably influenced by definitions of 
strategy. Thanks to its multi-dimensional and situational nature, strategy has been 
defined in a variety of ways, but usually with the common theme of a deliberate and 
conscious set of guidelines that determine actions into the future. This is typified by 
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Chandler’s view of strategy (1962: 13) as ‘the determination of the basic long term 
goals and objectives of the enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals.’ Mintzberg (1978) 
argues, however, that such definitions treat strategy as (a) explicit (b) developed 
consciously and purposefully, and (c) made in advance of the specific decisions i.e. 
strategy as plan. Mintzberg (1978) has considerably enriched our understanding of 
strategy by labelling the deliberate and conscious plan as “intended strategy”. 
Intended strategies that do not get realised can be described as unrealised 
strategies, and realised strategies that were never intended may be called emergent 
strategies. Additionally, there are other relationships between intended and realised 
strategies e.g. intended strategies that get over realised, emergent strategies that 
get formalised as deliberate ones, and intended strategies that change form and 
become in part, emergent. According to Mintzberg (1978: 935), strategy in general, 
and realised strategy in particular, can be defined as a ‘pattern in a stream of 
decisions’. In other words, when a sequence of decisions in some area exhibits a 
consistency over time, a strategy will be considered to have formed. This perspective 
enables us to consider strategy as intended, as well as strategies as evolved. The 
strategy maker may formulate a strategy through a conscious process, or a strategy 
may form gradually, perhaps unintentionally. Research on strategy formation – as 
distinct from formulation - can then focus on a tangible phenomenon, the decision 
stream, and strategies become observed patterns in such streams. 
 
     This decision-based view of strategy now appears to have wide support. 
Frederickson (1983) points out that while not all organisations have formal plans, 
they all make strategic decisions. Clearly, however, not all decisions are strategic. 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) define a strategic decision as one that is important, 
in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, and the precedents set. 
Chaffee (1985) suggests that organisations use strategy to deal with changing 
environments. Because change brings novel combinations of circumstances to the 
organisation, the substance of strategy remains ‘unstructured, un-programmed, non 
routine, and non-repetitive.’ Not only are strategic decisions related to the 
environment and non-routine, they are also considered to be important enough to 
affect the overall welfare of the organisation. To illustrate this point, Frederickson 
(1984: 459) reiterates a point made by Mintzberg:  ‘no type of decision is inherently 
strategic; decisions are strategic only in context. The introduction of a new product is 
a major event in a brewery, but hardly worth mentioning in a toy company.’  
 
     In addition to adopting a decision-based view, strategy process researchers also 
separate process from content. The literature typically distinguishes between the 
content of strategy and the strategy making process. Miller (1989) argues that the 
two are very much related, but that there have been few systematic attempts to 
explore the relationship between the process of strategy making and the content of a 
firm’s strategy, and nor have the performance implications of this match been 
investigated. In the same vein, Pettigrew (1992) observes that the sharp distinction 
between process and content appears more of an analytical hindrance than help, 
and that in the conduct of strategy process research, the what and the how, the 
content and the process, are best regarded as inseparable. 
 
     Most researchers, however, have tended to focus on process in isolation from 
content. Chakravarthy and White (2002) observe that while content researchers 
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describe “attractive destinations”, the getting there, “the journey”, is the 
preoccupation of strategy process researchers, While recognising the dangers of a 
disconnect between the journey and the destination, they suggest that the 
complexity of the strategy process frustrates efforts to establish explicit linkages. 
Accordingly, a body of work bounded by process has emerged. 
 
     Frederickson (1984) defined strategic process as a pattern of organisation 
behaviour that is visible to executive level members and postulates that the 
characteristics of that process tend to be consistent across decisions that are clearly 
perceived as strategic – i.e. there is an assumption of consistency.  Chakravarthy 
and Doz (1992) view strategic process as ‘how an organisation through its systems 
and processes, deliberate or unintentional, achieves or maintains it position.’ 
Underlining the importance of including implementation, Pettigrew (1992) takes the 
view that the process has two parts – choice processes and change processes, and 
highlights that the literature accordingly intertwines between strategic decision-
making and implementation. Hart and Banbury (1994), argue that strategy making 
can be conceptualised as a key process requiring purposeful design. Most recently, 
Chakravarthy and White (2002) simplify several of these views of strategic process 
into ‘how strategies are formed and implemented’. 
 
3. The strategic process, dynamic capabilities, and competitive advantage 
 
Although Hannan and Freeman (1989) suggest that decision processes matter little 
in the face of external constraints and environmental determinism, most researchers 
do not share this view. Dean and Sharfman (1996) observe that the argument that 
processes matter rests on two assumptions. Firstly, different processes lead to 
different choices. While this may seem intuitively obvious, it should be seen in the 
light of the observation that environmental constraints play a role in determining 
choices and thus reduce the importance of choice processes. However, some 
managers make very poor strategic choices, with devastating consequences for their 
firms, while others in very similar circumstances make much better choices for their 
firms. Secondly, different choices lead to different outcomes. Once again, external 
forces also influence outcomes, but it is unlikely that the influence of external forces 
eliminates the impact of strategic choice on effectiveness, as it is hard to imagine a 
situation in which all potential choices will be equally successful or unsuccessful 
 
     Hart (1992) observed that firms that demonstrate high process capacity might be 
expected to perform well on more performance dimensions than single mode or less 
process capable organisations. Several researchers have advocated explicitly the 
desirability of combining different modes of strategy making either sequentially or 
simultaneously. For instance, Chaffee (1985) suggests that there might be a 
hierarchy of strategy making types, where each successive level incorporates those 
that are less complex, and that firms accumulate strategic process skills over time. 
 
     This is consistent with resource-based theory in that it may be appropriate to think 
of firms possessing different combinations or levels of strategic processes and 
capabilities. Resource based theory holds that a competitive advantage based upon 
a single resource or skill is easier to identify than a competitive advantage that 
involves multiple competencies. Firms able to accumulate and develop several 
different process skills into a complex strategy-making “capability” might thus be 
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expected to outperform less process capable organisations (Hart and Banbury 
1994). 
 
     In their research, Hart and Banbury (1994) concluded that capability counts, and 
that high capability is robust i.e. higher levels of strategy making process capability 
facilitate superior performance in a wide variety of settings and situations, that 
strategy making process capability seems to make the most difference for large firms 
operating in turbulent environments and that strategy making processes are 
significant predictors of firm performance. 
 
     Support for the importance of strategic process also comes from Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) who contend that both theoretical and empirical research into the 
sources of advantage has begun to point to organisational capabilities rather than 
product market positions or tactics as the enduring source of competitive advantage. 
Strategy-making is therefore a potential dynamic capability of the firm. 
 
4. Strategic process typologies and sense making devices 
 
As Hambrick (1984) points out, the strategy field is rich in inductive research, based 
on a search for commonly recurring patterns. This has resulted in numerous 
classification schemes that offer cognitive assistance and help bring order to an 
extremely cluttered landscape.  
 
     A range of strategy archetypes developed by various researchers is displayed in 
Figure 1, based on Hart (1992), adapted and updated by the author: 
 
Figure 1: Strategic Process Typologies - A Selection
Allison Rational, organisational, bureaucratic 
Mintzberg Entrepreneurial, planning, adaptive 
Chaffee Linear, adaptive, interpretive 
Ansoff Systematic, ad hoc, reactive, organic 
Nonaka Deductive, compressive, inductive 
Bourgeois / 
Brodwin 
Commander, change, cultural, collaborative, crescive 
Frederickson Synoptic, incremental 
Hart Command, symbolic, rational, transactive, generative 
Mintzberg Design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, cognitive, 
learning, political, cultural, environmental 
Bailey / Johnson Planning, incremental, political, cultural, command, 
enforced choice 
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      For reasons of space, all these typologies are not examined here. The 
contributions of Chaffee (1985), Ansoff (1987), Hart (1992), and Frederickson (1984) 
are particularly prominent, and readers interested in their work are directed to Tables 
1-3 and 5-6 attached.  In this section, we focus instead on the evolution of the 
strategic process domain from planning to learning, which are widely considered the 
polarities of the field (Brews and Hunt, 1999). 
 
     The foundations of the strategy process literature lie in the well-known rational 
model, which calls for comprehensive and exhaustive analysis prior to decision. The 
rational model applied to strategy suggests systematic environment analysis, 
assessment of internal strengths and weaknesses, explicit goal setting, evaluation of 
alternative courses of action, and the development of a comprehensive plan to 
achieve the goals. Organisationally, this usually called for a formal planning system.  
 
     However, behavioural theory has challenged the assumptions of rationality. Nutt  
(1984) observes that managers do not use the normative methods prescribed by 
scholars for good decision-making. Most decision processes were found to be 
solution centred – an approach that restricts innovation – with a limited number of 
alternatives considered, and perpetuation of biases. Hart (1992) emphasises that 
individuals and organisations can only achieve bounded rationality. Heuristics and 
biases in human judgement result in many departures from optimality. The 
motivational assumptions inherent in rational strategy making process are also 
questionable. Also, at an organisational level, strategic assumptions and frames of 
reference can predispose firms to act in certain ways. Independent assumptions 
about organisational intention and changing roles can result in a “garbage can 
model” of strategic choice in which strategy emerges out of “organised anarchy” 
(Cohen et al.  1972). Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992), reflecting on rationality in 
strategic decision making, conclude that people are rational, but only boundedly so, 
that power wins battles of choice, and that chance affects the course of strategic 
decision making. Further, although there is a long-standing view of rationality versus 
bounded rationality as a continuum, rationality is more multidimensional. Decision 
makers are rational in some ways but not in others. Strategic decision-making is 
therefore best described as an interweaving of both boundedly rational and political 
and social processes.  
 
     In the wake of behavioural theory, Mintzberg’s research accelerated the 
scepticism towards the traditional view. Mintzberg (1978) identified three modes of 
strategy-making viz. planning, adaptive, and entrepreneurial. The planning mode 
represented the largest body of published materials at that time, and in the tradition 
of management science and bureaucratic theory, describes the process as highly 
ordered, neatly integrated, with strategies explicated on schedule by a purposeful 
organisation. The adaptive mode was described as a process in which many 
decision makers with conflicting goals bargain among themselves to produce a 
stream of incremental, disjointed decisions. In the entrepreneurial mode, a powerful 
leader takes bold, risky decisions towards the vision of the organisation’s future. A 
compelling argument was also made that in addition to the limitations derived from 
bounded rationality, there were other significant problems with the planning mode. 
The dichotomy between formulator and implementer appeared to be based on two 
questionable assumptions - that the planner was fully informed, or at least as well as 
the implementer, and that the environment was sufficiently stable, or at least 
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predictable, to ensure that there would be no need for reformulation during 
implementation. Mintzberg & Waters (1985) subsequently refined this work and 
suggested that deliberate and emergent strategies may be conceived as two ends of 
a continuum along which real world strategies lie. Along this continuum, various 
other types of strategy may be found  - planned, entrepreneurial, ideological, 
umbrella, process, unconnected, consensus, and imposed – and these are 
excerpted from their work (1985: 270) in Table 4. 
 
     Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) cemented their position as the dominant thinkers in 
strategic process, by identifying ten different strategy process schools in 1999. On 
the basis that these represent the most comprehensive, most nuanced, and most 
contemporary view, some details of these schools are offered below. 
 
     Figure 2, excerpted from Mintzberg and Lampel (1999: 28) presents an overview 
of the ten schools: 
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     The ten schools may be divided into three prescriptive and seven descriptive 
categories. Mintzberg and Lampel (1999: 29) acknowledge that while the prescriptive 
schools are clear and consistent, making the dissemination and adoption of their 
ideas into practice easier, the descriptive schools are fuller and richer, but are untidy, 
and “can end up in tangled confusion, generating many contingencies and multiple 
perspectives that stymie application”. The schools comprise: 
 
Prescriptive Schools 
 
Design 
 
In this perspective, which dates back to the 1960s, senior management formulates 
clear, simple, and unique strategies in a deliberate process of conscious thought – 
which is neither formally analytical nor informally intuitive – so that everyone can 
implement the strategies. The design school continues to influence the teaching and 
practice of strategy even today. 
 
Planning 
 
This school makes assumptions similar to the design school, but significantly, adds 
the notion that the process is not just cerebral, but also a formal one that consists of 
distinct stages, checklists, and techniques. The formalisation results in staff planners 
replacing senior managers as the key actors. 
 
Positioning 
 
In this view, heavily influenced by industrial organisation economics, the essence of 
strategy is a choice of generic positions selected through formalised industry 
analysis, and planners become analysts. The resulting veneer of “science” has 
resulted in a burgeoning consulting industry based on the positioning school. 
 
Descriptive Schools 
 
Entrepreneurial 
 
This school is centred on the chief executive, and is underpinned by the idea that the 
strategy process is anchored in “the mysteries of intuition”. Precise designs, plans, or 
positions give way to visions or broad perspectives. Frequently found in specific 
contexts such as start-up or turnaround, the leader maintains close control over 
implementation, and the distinction between formulation and implementation 
assumed in the prescriptive schools begins to wither away. 
 
Cognitive 
 
This school is based on psychology, and puts the mental process – cognitive 
schema, models, and maps used by individuals and groups to construct strategy in 
their minds – and the centre of the strategy process. 
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Learning 
 
The most significant of the descriptive schools, learning describes a process in which 
strategies are emergent, found throughout the organisation, and action often 
precedes the plan. Formulation and implementation therefore intertwine. Pascale 
(1996: 89), a proponent of strategy as learning, observes that ‘there is a widespread 
tendency to overlook the process by which organisations experiment, adapt, and 
learn. We tend to impute coherence and purposive rationality to events when the 
opposite may be closer to the truth. How an organisation deals with miscalculation, 
mistakes, and serendipitous events outside its field of vision is often crucial to 
success over time.  In reality, corporate direction evolves from an incremental 
adjustment to unfolding events.’  
 
Power 
 
Strategy making is essentially a political process in this school. Persuasion, coalition 
building, and negotiating are key themes. Micro power encapsulates power play 
within the organisation, whereas macro power involves the organisational entity 
using its power over other organisations. 
 
Cultural 
 
While the focus of the power school is self-interest, the cultural school focuses on 
common interest, and views strategy as a social process rooted in organisation 
culture. 
 
Environmental 
 
Strategy is essentially shaped in response to the demands of the environment, with 
the organisation having limited freedom to manoeuvre. 
 
Configuration 
 
This is an integrative school that visualises organisations as configurations i.e. 
coherent clusters of characteristics and behaviours, and integrates the points of view 
of the other schools. Each configuration therefore has its own place. Bailey and 
Johnson (2001) offer the most recent instance of configuration research.  Having 
derived six theoretical archetypes of the strategy process from the literature, they 
theorise that the strategy development process will be characterised by an 
interrelationship between these perspectives, and that there will be discernible 
configurations of strategy development processes described as planning, logical 
incremental, rational command, muddling through, externally dependent, and 
embattled command, and these configurations will be discernible by context, whether 
at industry, firm, or manager level. They also suggest that these patterns of strategy 
development for an organisation will change over time 
 
     Having articulated the ten schools, Mintzberg & Lampel (1999) leave open the 
possibility that some or many of the schools could represent different stages of the 
same strategy process. For example, data that is analysed in the positioning school 
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could feed into the cognitive school that focuses on the mind of the strategist, and 
the planning school looks ahead, to program the strategy created. 
 
     The 10 schools may usefully be recast along the deliberate – emergent and 
prescriptive – descriptive axes, as shown overleaf in Figure 3. 
 
     Although the labels of prescriptive and descriptive are not mutually exclusive – 
indeed in a discussion with the author (Laljani, 2002) Mintzberg has suggested that 
planning has descriptive elements and conversely, learning has some prescriptive 
elements, it is the author’s contention that each school has a discernible centre of 
gravity along the prescriptive – descriptive scale. 
 
     This re-mapping highlights that as the strategy process field has evolved away 
from the rational model, it has also moved away from a prescriptive mode to a 
descriptive mode, with obvious implications for management practice. In effect, as 
our understanding of the reality of the strategy process has improved, advice to 
managers on ways and means in which they can build their ability to make strategy 
has not kept pace. Similarly, the teaching of strategy remains anchored in the 
design, planning, and positioning schools. 
 
 
Figure 3: Re-casting Mintzberg’s Schools
Deliberate Emergent
Descriptive
Prescriptive
Design
Planning
Positioning
Entrepreneurial
Cognitive
Power
Cultural
Environmental
Learning
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     It may be useful to dwell briefly on sense making devices offered by some 
researchers to assist understanding of the proliferation of models in the literature.  
 
     Hart and Banbury (1994) suggest that the literature offers three recurrent 
variables which may be used to differentiate the various perspectives: rationality i.e. 
the extent to which the strategic process can or should be comprehensive, 
exhaustive and analytical in approach; vision i.e. the role of top managers in the 
strategic process and the extent to which leaders can articulate a clear strategic 
vision and motivate organisational members to adopt it; and involvement i.e. the 
extent and type of involvement of organisation members in the strategy making 
process. Two of these three variables are similar to those identified by Miller (1989), 
who defines rationality as high information processing versus low information 
processing, interaction as a high degree of politicking, bargaining, consensus 
building versus low, and thirdly, assertiveness including levels of risk taking and 
whether decisions are reactive or proactive. 
 
     Ansoff (1987) suggests that the scientific lens or “optics” that researches have 
brought to their model building have varied and have spanned cognitive-logical, 
psycho-sociological, social-anthropological, and political, to cite a few, and that these 
have accentuated the differences among the alternative models of strategic 
behaviour. 
 
     Frederickson (1986) suggests that the various models of strategy formation can 
be differentiated on six characteristics, which are: what initiates the process, the role 
of goals, the relationship between means and ends, the concept of choice, how 
comprehensive organisations are in making individual strategic decisions, and how 
comprehensive they are in integrating those decisions into an overall strategy. 
 
     A fuller explanation of these as excerpted from Frederickson (1986: 283) may be 
found in Table 5. Frederickson also characterises the polarities in the strategic 
process into synoptic and incremental approaches. The dominant synoptic type is 
based on a rational model of decision making, the incremental alternative purports to 
provide a more accurate description of how organisations actually make strategic 
decisions. A comparison of these is presented in Table 6 (Frederickson 1983: 566). 
 
5. Bridging the planning / learning divide 
 
The polarities of the schools are perhaps best epitomised by Ansoff, an advocate of 
planning, and Mintzberg, an advocate of learning. The same dichotomy is reflected 
Hart’s rational and transactive modes, and in Frederickson’s synoptic and 
incremental modes. 
 
     Langley (1990) researched the use of formal analysis in strategic decisions and 
concluded that strategic decision-making is rarely totally encompassed within a 
comprehensive analytic process, but formal analysis is used in an incremental way in 
decisions. Formal analysis is used for a variety of purposes in organisations, and the 
way in which it is used varies from organisation to organisation. Principally, there are 
three patterns of use: (a) analysis is used for substantive input to decisions, to 
control implementation, and to ensure convergence towards action, (b) analysis is a 
key tool of persuasion and verification in the negotiating process between levels of 
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the hierarchy concerning actions to be taken, and (c) analysis is used in an 
unproductive way as people stake out contradictory positions, and attempt to gain 
time in an atmosphere of indecision and divergence. In effect, formal analysis is 
used not just for decision-making, but also as a social and political tool. 
 
     Thanks to decades of planning / performance research which have yielded 
inconsistent findings, there has been a widespread rejection of formal planning. 
Brews and Hunt (1999) question this general condemnation of formal strategic 
planning argue that there is a methodological explanation for the inconsistent 
research findings viz. poor conceptualisations and measurement protocols utilised to 
operationalise the planning construct. Brews and Hunt (1999) contend that far from 
being the antithesis of learning, formal planning may be the necessary precursor to 
successful learning. Both are necessary, and neither is sufficient. In their view, 
dissatisfaction with formal planning has surfaced the practices to be avoided in 
planning, rather than providing support for the proposition that the remedy for bad 
planning is no planning. In fact, the remedy for bad planning is good planning, which 
includes learning and incrementalism within its ambit. Though plans should be 
specific, they must also be flexible, especially in unstable environments. Once 
formed, firms must be prepared to rework plans incrementally as plans proceed. 
Additionally, the planning capabilities of the firm can and do improve over time – 
“firms must both learn to plan, and plan to learn”. 
 
6. Searching for the strategist in strategy 
 
Many studies of the strategic process are based on flows of information and 
decisions, detached from the people involved. What are we to make of the role of the 
strategist in strategy? Some researchers are silent on this issue, while others 
suggest that the role is vital. 
 
     Although strategy making in the rational model is envisioned as the province of 
the top managers, this view has given way to the increasing involvement of other 
organisational members. Difficulties with strategy implementation, and an increased 
rate of environmental change are often cited as the reason for such involvement  
(Hart and Banbury 1994). The consensus is that strategy making can no longer be 
limited conceptually to the CEO or the top management team, and that strategy 
making is an organisation wide phenomenon. 
 
     Ericson, Melander, and Melin (2001) suggest that the role of the strategist varies 
depending upon the theoretical perspective, and offer the following typology: 
 
1. The missing strategist, particularly in the rational / analytical processes. This is 
paradoxical, for in spite of his / her rational and analytical abilities, his / her 
contributions to the strategy process remains unacknowledged 
2. The great strategist – here the importance is highly recognised, and the role is 
often inspirational, motivational, and visionary 
3. The coalition view – here the strategist is a gestalt, rather than a single human 
being, typically made up of the top management group or other coalitions of 
stakeholders. In this typology, networking and politicking are important means to 
achieve ends in the strategy formation process 
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4. The invisible strategist – an institutional force, rather than one or more key actors, 
exercises the dominating influence on the strategy formation process e.g. the 
organisation’s values and beliefs or culture, or industry recipe 
 
     Hambrick and Mason (1984) contend that top executives matter, that 
organisations become a reflection of their top managers, and that strategic choices 
and performance levels are partially predicted by managerial background 
characteristics. Managers act on the basis of their incomplete, filtered, and highly 
stylised understanding of their situations. In order to understand why organisations 
do things the way they do, and why they perform the way they do, we must 
understand the values, motives, and biases of the top team. Significantly, in this 
“upper echelons” perspective, it is also suggested that the characteristics of the top 
management team matter much more than those of just the single top most 
executive. Demographic characteristics – such as tenure, functional background, 
education etc – could be seen as partial indicators of psychological properties and 
executive dispositions. Despite the limited, imprecise, and surrogate nature of 
demographics, Hambrick (1984) contends that a number of highly significant 
associations between executive profiles and organisational outcomes have been 
observed. In the same vein, Bowman and Daniels (1995) suggest that managers’ 
belief structures are derived from their experience, and report evidence of functional 
bias in managers’ perceptions of strategic priorities. 
 
     By contrast, Wooldridge and Floyd (1999) offer a “middle management 
perspective” with their finding that involvement in the formation of strategy by middle 
managers is associated with improved organisational performance. Specifically, 
consensus among middle managers does not impact organisational performance, 
but involvement does. The implication is that top managers must encourage middle 
managers to think strategically; that the involvement of middle managers must be 
substantive, and that this is best achieved in settings where individuals are given the 
freedom to critically examine strategic decisions.  
 
     Floyd and Lane (2000) present a distillation of previous research findings in the 
form of ten specific roles that top, middle, and operating management perform in the 
strategic process. These are displayed in Table 7. Each of the ten roles involves 
processing information and taking action that facilitates change. It should be noted, 
however, that there are overlaps across the roles, and also that the definition of top, 
middle, and operating management varies considerably across organisational 
settings. 
 
     Other research also makes it clear that executives and managers can assume a 
variety of postures and roles. For instance, Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) suggest 
that the role played by top managers can range from that of a “commander”, where 
strategy is consciously formulated at the top and issues to the rest of the 
organisation to what might be called the “sponsor” where strategy emerges from 
below and is merely recognised and approved from the top. Similarly the 
complementary role played by managers can range from “good soldier” where 
members execute the plans formulated by top management to “entrepreneur” where 
they are expected to behave autonomously and pursue new initiatives. 
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     In response to the increased awareness of the role of cognition in strategic issue 
diagnosis and problem formulation, cognitive researchers have weighed in with 
significant contributions towards understanding the mind of the strategist, but many 
unanswered questions persist. Schwenk (1988) identifies several topics related to 
cognition that impact the decision process, such as cognitive heuristics and biases, 
which result in assumptions and cognitive maps. In addition, analogy and metaphor 
may be the means by which assumptions from other problem domains are applied to 
new strategic problems. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) suggest that there is a need 
to better understand the heuristics of senior managers, and a need to explore which 
heuristics are most relevant to strategic decision making, how they work, why they 
work, and when they are most appropriate. In addition, while the role of insight – the 
juxtaposition of competing alternatives or problems leading to a quantum shift in 
gestalt - is recognised, both theory and findings are in short supply in this area. The 
study of intuition is another way to create a more realistic view of how strategic 
decision makers actually think. Equally, social and political conflict in the strategic 
process is inadequately understood. Are some sources of conflict more beneficial 
than others? Is there an optimal level of conflict? How does conflict relate to decision 
quality? How can strategic decision makers gain the benefits of conflict without the 
costs? 
 
7. The development of strategic capability: individual versus organisation 
perspectives 
 
Since researchers have offered both individual and organisational perspectives, it is 
this author’s premise that strategic capability resides at the intersection of the 
individual and the organisation.  
 
     Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) observe that strategic decision-making is a dynamic 
capability in which managers pool their various business, functional, and personal 
expertise to make the choices that shape the major strategic moves of the firm. 
Further, they suggest that repeated practice is an important learning mechanism for 
the development of a dynamic capability. Practice helps people to understand 
processes more effectively and so develop more effective routines. The codification 
of experience into technology and formal procedures makes that experience easier 
to apply and accelerates the building of routines. Mistakes also play a role in the 
evolution of dynamic capabilities. Small losses, more than either major success or 
failures contribute to effective learning. While success often fails to engage 
managers’ attention sufficiently so that they learn from their experience, major 
failures raise defence mechanisms that block learning. Pacing of experience also 
impacts development of capabilities. Experience that comes too fast can overwhelm 
managers, leading to an inability to transform experience into meaningful learning. 
Infrequent experience can lead to forgetting what was learned previously and so 
result in little knowledge accumulation. 
 
     Shrivastava and Grant (1985) also postulate that strategic decision processes 
have a relationship with a critical related process, namely organisational learning, 
which may be defined as the autonomous capacity of organisations to create, share, 
and use strategic information about themselves and their environments for decision 
making. Decision makers cope with uncertainty by searching for, acquiring, and then 
using relevant information. These activities may be institutionalised in organisational 
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learning processes, which shape the organisation’s knowledge base about action-
outcome relationships and the influence of the environment upon these relationships. 
To the extent that strategy formation draws upon this knowledge base, strategy is 
influenced by learning processes. Managers therefore need to design and develop 
learning systems that support strategic decision process within their organisation. 
 
     Johnson (1988) proposes an “organisational action” view of strategy formation in 
which strategy can best be seen as the product of the political, cognitive, and cultural 
fabric of the organisation. A key driver of strategic thinking is the set of assumptions 
and beliefs taken for granted by managers, and held relatively common through the 
organisation. This set of assumptions and beliefs amounts to what other writers have 
referred to as a paradigm. The paradigm is a generalised set of beliefs about an 
organisation and the way it is or should be. Since it is taken for granted, it may be 
difficult to surface as a coherent statement. The paradigm is closely related to the 
dominant organisational routines, which in turn play a substantial part in shaping 
strategy in the business. Specifically, the paradigm plays a central role in the 
interpretation of environmental stimuli and the configuration of organisationally 
relevant strategic responses. Johnson (1988) argues that the paradigm is preserved 
and legitimised in a “cultural web” of organisational action in terms of myths, rituals, 
symbols, control systems, and formal and informal power structures that support and 
provide relevance to core beliefs. The key implication is that this organisational 
context may restrain individual ability to think and act. Ideological heterogeneity in 
management systems, deliberate assumption surfacing and challenging devices, 
and active involvement of “outsiders” with less adherence to the organisational 
culture or paradigm therefore become important as part of the strategic process. 
 
     Along the same lines, Starbuck (1983: 93) argues that ‘decision making is non 
adaptive because behaviours get programmed through spontaneous habits, 
professional norms, education, training, precedents, traditions, rituals, as well as 
through formalised procedures’. 
 
     Frederickson (1986) adds to the organisational perspective by asserting that the 
relationship between structure and strategy is reciprocal. Structure can have a 
profound and deterministic effect on strategy. Organisations that differ in their 
dominant structure (centralisation, formalisation, complexity dimensions) are likely to 
make strategic decisions using very different processes. 
 
     Frederickson and Iaquinto (1989) also suggest that strategic decision processes 
are likely to exhibit considerable inertia, resisting all but modest change. This feature 
can also be described as momentum, or simply habit. 
 
8. Management praxis and logical incrementalism 
 
Managers must work with the paradox that high performance appears to require the 
simultaneous mastery of seemingly contradictory skills. Hart and Banbury (1994) 
contend that  ‘high performance firms were simultaneously planful and incremental, 
directive and participative, controlling and empowering, visionary and detailed’. 
 
 15
     Purity of process therefore appears to be much less important than the nurturing 
of multiple, competing and complementary processes of strategy making deep within 
the organisation. 
 
     In sympathy with this need to straddle paradoxical processes, “logical 
incrementalism”, an integrating methodology sometimes also described as 
“purposeful muddling” has been proposed as the normative ideal for strategy making 
by Quinn (1980). Logical incrementalism is underpinned by a desire to tap the talents 
and psychological drives of the whole organisation, to create cohesion, and to 
generate identity with the emerging strategy. In this model executives may be able to 
predict the broad direction, but not he precise nature of the ultimate strategy that will 
result. Accordingly, top managers focus on identifying a broad direction, allowing the 
details to emerge over time. Rather than seeking to be comprehensive  - the ideal of 
rationality – top managers work to create a general sense of purpose and directions 
that will guide the actions taken by organisation members. Executives managing 
strategic change ‘artfully blend formal analysis, behavioural techniques, and power 
politics to bring about cohesive, step by step movement towards ends which are 
initially broadly conceived, but which are then constantly refined and reshaped as 
new information appears’. (Quinn 1980: 3).  
 
     In his research, Quinn (1980: 17) observed that ‘successful managers acted 
logically and incrementally to improve the quality of information used in key 
decisions, to overcome the personal and political pressures resisting change, to deal 
with the varying lead times and sequencing problems in critical decisions, and to 
build the organisational awareness, understanding, and psychological commitment 
essential to effective strategies. By the time the strategies began to crystallize, 
pieces of them were already being implemented. Through the very processes they 
used to formulate their strategies, these executives had built sufficient organisational 
momentum and identity with the strategies to make them flow towards flexible and 
successful implementation’. In logical incrementalism, strategy formulation is a 
continuously evolving analytical – political consensus process with neither a finite 
beginning nor a definite end. ‘The total process was anything but linear. It was a 
groping, cyclical process that often circled back on itself, with frequent interruptions 
and delays’  (Quinn 1980: 13). This model of strategy making is akin to ‘fermentation 
in biochemistry rather than an industrial assembly line’.  
 
9. The state of the domain, and implications for further research 
 
While the domain has been enriched by its multi-disciplinary pedigree, it has suffered 
from a lack of links with strategy outcomes, and with some notable exceptions, a 
focus on discrete decisions rather than patterns of decisions and actions over time. 
An over-emphasis on base disciplines has resulted in fragmentation and a lack of 
multi-disciplinary perspectives in the same study. 
 
     The domain has also experienced methodological constraints. Most studies of 
strategy process to date have been retrospective case histories conducted after the 
outcomes were known; with the attendant risk that prior knowledge of success or 
failure may have resulted in bias (Van de Ven, 1992). While the case studies have 
provided rich insight, generalisability has been problematic given their context 
specificity. Additionally, much of the work has been characterised by small sample 
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sizes and self-reporting of phenomena, with the possibility that correlations do not 
reflect causality, and conversely that reciprocal causality is a very real possibility 
(Wooldridge and Floyd 1999). Frederickson (1984) asserts that the field is 
characterised by little testing of many of the observations, and that the lack of 
empirical testing in strategy process research can be attributed to poorly trained 
investigators, the intangible nature of strategy process constructs, and the practical 
difficulties of doing strategic level research in terms of organisational access. 
Consequently, most studies of the strategic decision process have produced either a 
very focused set of observations regarding one process question, or a very rich but 
loose description of the entire decision process. Similarly, Bailey and Johnson (2001) 
suggest that researchers have sought to derive explanations through the application 
of unitary frameworks whereas the reality is that the strategy development process is 
more likely to be multifaceted. It is also apparent that there is an overwhelming 
geographical bias, as much of the research remains based in the USA, with some 
European activity (Pettigrew 2002). Perspectives from Asia or other parts of the 
world are conspicuous by their absence. Redressing this balance, and also 
conducting real time studies of strategic change processes as they unfold in their 
natural field settings using new methods and skills of action science will give this 
domain an added impetus. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
Thanks to the efforts of various researchers, our understanding of the realities of the 
strategic process has become richer and more finely grained over the years. 
However, much more remains to be done. In particular, many of the findings are 
descriptive, and do not lend themselves immediately to application in managerial 
practice. In other words, there are significant gaps, both in theory and practice, in our 
understanding of how the strategic process can be managed better to produce the 
desired strategic outcomes.  At the same time, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that strategic capability is at the heart of the strategic effectiveness of the 
organisation. Consequently, an investigation into the nature and dimensions of 
strategic capability, given what we know about the realities of the strategic process, 
as well as how such a capability may be acquired or developed within organisational, 
team, and individual perspectives, offers a meaningful agenda for further research. 
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Table 1: A Commentary on Chaffee’s Strategy Process Models 
Linear Model 
 
The linear model corresponds to what others have called the planning model, and 
assumes a progressive series of steps of goal setting, analysis, evaluation, selection, 
and the planning of implementation to achieve an optimal long term direction for the 
organisation. The term linear was chosen because it connotes the methodical, 
directed, sequential action involved in planning. In this model, top managers are 
portrayed as having considerable capacity to change the organisation, and 
organisations are necessarily tightly coupled. Interest in the linear model waned in 
the mid 1970s as the strategic problem came to be seen as much more complex. 
Reflecting on Chaffee’s categories, Johnson (1988) notes that the time consuming 
and forward looking nature of planning results in decisions made today based on 
beliefs about the future. If such decisions are not to be a waste of time, one must 
assume that either the organisation is well insulated from the environment or that the 
environment is relatively predictable. The model also assumes that organisations 
have goals and that accomplishing goals is the most important outcome of strategy. 
 
Adaptive Model 
 
Adaptive, a term also used by Mintzberg, involves incremental strategic change, 
although explanations of this phenomenon vary considerably from those who see it 
as essentially logical or rational and those who account for the phenomenon in terms 
of satisficimg behaviour in a political or cognitive limits context. The adaptive model 
differs from linear in two ways – monitoring the environment and making changes 
are simultaneous and continuous functions. The organisation is viewed as a complex 
system and the boundary between the organisation and its environment is highly 
porous. Action is responsive to the nature and magnitude of the perceived or 
anticipated environmental pressures, and advance planning is relatively unimportant. 
The adaptive model relies heavily upon an evolutionary biological model of 
organisations. Rather than assuming that the organisation must deal with the 
environment, the adaptive model assumes that the organisation must change with 
the environment.  
 
Interpretive Model 
 
Development of the interpretive model parallels interest in corporate culture. A 
recurring theme is that the organisation is based on a social contract, and assumes 
that reality is socially constructed. The interpretive model is embedded in an 
“organisational action” view of strategy in which strategy is seen as a product of 
political, programmatic, cognitive, or symbolic aspects of management. 
 
Comment 
 
Chaffee’s models can be interrelated in a hierarchy of systems, made up of a 
mechanistic linear model, a biological adaptive model, incorporating linear, and a 
cultural interpretive model incorporating both linear and adaptive strategy. A key 
proposition is that organisations improve their strategic management as they 
progress from one model into another. 
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Table 2: A Commentary on Ansoff’s Strategy Process Categories 
Organic Model 
 
In the organic model, strategic behaviour is unmanaged, serendipitous, and 
determined by socio-political forces. When confronted by a crisis, the organisation 
focuses its attention on finding a survival solution, but the process remains organic 
and unguided by logic. Power is distributed among several groups, and no group is 
powerful enough to impose its will on the rest. Bargaining and power struggles are 
the mechanisms through which choices are made. There is a multiplicity of cultures, 
and no agreement upon common goals. These organisations can only survive in 
environments that put little pressure on the organisation to use its resources 
effectively. 
 
 
Reactive Model 
 
Strategic behaviour in reactive model organisations is an incremental adaptation to 
dysfunctions in organisational performance. The environmental setting is 
characterised by slowly evolving challenges and low competitive intensity. Strategic 
behaviour is a result of the interaction between the organisations survival drive and 
organisational inertia. In both organic and reactive modes, the word “manager” is 
rarely encountered – the operative word is the organisation or the firm.  
 
 
Ad hoc Management Model 
Under ad hoc management, the firm is a deliberate shaper of its own development, 
and the logic of this development is largely inertial. Management chooses and 
guides strategic development through steps that are logical incremental extensions 
of the prior historically successful steps. Key managers are individual actors and 
they make their decisions “locally” without reference to a global plan. However 
decisions by different managers are consistent with one another because they grow 
out of a mutually experienced strategic history of the firm. The perspective deployed 
is psycho-sociological, and managers are very much in evidence. Environments are 
strongly competitive, growth is strong and extrapolative, and the new challenges are 
incremental and local in the sense that they affect only one part of the firm 
 
 
Systematic Management Model 
Lastly, in systematic management, the firm is guided by a comprehensive and 
explicit strategy, which is systematically planned and co-operatively executed. The 
firm tries to anticipate rather than react, and based on an anticipation of future 
threats and opportunities from the environment, firms make a choice of their future 
strategy. Decisions are not “local” but “global”, made through an organisation wide 
systematic strategic planning process. This model is based on logical reasoning, and 
assumes that top management is committed to leading the firm into new strategic 
domains whenever the necessity for doing so becomes clear, and that management 
relies upon comprehensive logical analysis in selecting the new domains. It also 
assumes that reasonable people will do reasonable things, even if these things 
violate historical inertia. 
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Table 3: A Commentary on Hart’s Integrative Modes of the Strategic Process 
Command Mode 
 
A strong individual leader or a few top managers that exercise total control over the 
firm. Strategising is a conscious, controlled process, but centralised.  
 
Symbolic Mode 
 
In symbolic mode, top management creates a compelling vision and a clear 
corporate mission, and defines basic philosophy and values. The use of symbols, 
metaphors, and emotion are central to this process. The role of top management is 
to motivate and inspire organisation members with a clear mission, shared values, 
and an emotionally appealing corporate vision or dream. 
 
Rational Mode 
 
The rational mode is characterised by a high degree of information processing with 
formal analysis often used, the process is institutionalised through formal strategic 
planning, and organisation members participate in a formal system requiring upward 
sharing of data and information. The result is a detailed plan of action. To ensure 
implementation top management carefully monitors and controls subordinates and 
holds them accountable for performance against plan, and structure follows strategy. 
 
Transactive Mode 
 
In transactive mode, the essence is strategy making based on iteration and learning. 
Strategy is crafted based on an ongoing dialogue with key stakeholders. Cross-
functional communication is central. Feedback and learning necessitate an iterative 
approach.  
 
Generative Mode 
 
Generative mode organisations are dependent upon the autonomous behaviour of 
organisation members. Strategy is made via intrapreneurship. Ideas emerge 
upwards and employee initiative shapes the firm’s strategic directions. Top 
managers are primarily involved in selecting and nurturing high quality proposals that 
emerge from below. The role of top management is to encourage experimentation 
and risk taking. The five modes are not mutually exclusive – it is assumed that firms 
will develop skill in several modes over time, resulting in varying levels of strategy 
making capability. 
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Table 4: Description of Types of Strategies – Mintzberg & Waters 
 
 
Strategy 
 
 
Major features 
 
Planned 
 
Strategies originate in formal plans: precise intentions exist, 
formulated and articulated by central leadership, backed up by 
formal controls to ensure surprise-free implementation in benign, 
controllable or predictable environment; strategies most 
deliberate. 
 
Entrepreneurial Strategies originate in central vision: intentions exist as personal, 
unarticulated vision of single leader, and so adaptable to new 
opportunities; organisation under personal control of leader and 
located in protected niche in environment; strategies relatively 
deliberate but can emerge. 
 
Ideological Strategies originate in shared beliefs: intentions exist as 
collective vision of all actors, in inspirational form and relatively 
immutable, controlled normatively through indoctrination and/or 
socialisation; organisation often proactive vis-à-vis environment; 
strategies rather deliberate 
 
Umbrella Strategies originate in constraints: leadership, in partial control of 
organisational actions, defines strategic boundaries or targets 
within which other actors respond to own forces or to complex, 
perhaps also unpredictable environment; strategies partly 
deliberate, partly emergent and deliberately emergent 
 
Process Strategies originate in process: leadership controls process 
aspects of strategy (hiring, structure, etc) leaving content aspects 
to other actors; strategies partly deliberate, partly emergent (and, 
again, deliberately emergent) 
 
Unconnected Strategies originate in enclaves: actor(s) loosely coupled to rest 
of organisation produce(s) patterns in own actions in absence of, 
or in direct contradiction to, central or common intentions; 
strategies organisationally emergent whether or not deliberate for 
actor(s) 
 
Consensus Strategies originate in consensus: through mutual adjustment, 
actors converge on patterns that become pervasive in absence 
of central or common intentions; strategies rather emergent 
 
Imposed Strategies originate in environment: environment dictates 
patterns in actions either through direct imposition or through 
implicitly pre-empting or bounding organisational choice; 
strategies most emergent, although may be internalised by 
organisation and made deliberate 
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Table 5: Frederickson’s Critical Strategic Decision Process Characteristics 
 
 
Process Characteristics 
 
Description and Questions 
 
 
Process initiation 
 
Concerned with how and where the process is initiated.  Is the 
process initiated as a reaction to problems/crises, or the 
proactive pursuit of opportunities and interests? At what level 
(operating or strategic) would a stimulus have to appear before 
members would recognise it as being strategic?  What level 
assumes primary responsibility for initiating the process? 
 
Role of goals Issues regarding the role that goals play in the decision 
process.  Will decisions be made to achieve individual versus 
organisation-level goals?  Will goals be ‘remedial’  changes 
from the status quo, or ‘positive’, future intended states?  Are 
the goals likely to be conceptualised in precise versus general 
terms? 
 
Means/ends relationship Concerned with the relationship that exists between means 
(alternatives) and ends (goals).  What is the likelihood that 
means will displace ends (goals) in the decision process?  Will 
goals persist in the face of significant changes in the available 
means? 
 
Explanation of strategic 
action 
Considers alternative explanations of the process that resulted 
in strategic action.  Is strategic action most accurately 
characterised as intendedly rational strategic choice, the result 
of standardised organisational processes, an internal process of 
political bargaining, or some other explanation?  What is the 
likelihood that strategic moves will be incremental versus major 
departures from the existing strategy? 
 
Comprehensiveness in 
decision making 
Attempting to identify the factors that limit the 
comprehensiveness of the strategic decision process.  Is the 
primary constraint on the comprehensiveness of the strategic 
process top management’s cognitive limitations, the detail 
achieved in the design of standardised organisational 
processes, or managers’ parochial perceptions? 
 
Comprehensiveness in 
integrating decisions 
Concerned with how comprehensively individual decisions are 
integrated.  What level of integration is achieved to form an 
overall strategy? 
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Table 6: 
Differences Between Frederickson’s Synoptic and Incremental Strategic Decision Process 
 
 
Characteristic 
 
Synoptic Processes 
 
Incremental Processes 
 
 
Motive for initiation 
 
 
 
 
Concept of goals 
 
 
 
Relationship between 
means (alternatives) and 
ends (goals) 
 
 
 
 
Concept of choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analytic 
comprehensiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrative 
comprehensiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Process is initiated in 
response to problems or 
opportunities that appear during 
the constant surveillance. 
 
The process is directed at 
achieving a specified goal or 
future intended state 
 
The goal is identified before and 
independent of the analysis of 
alternatives.  Decision making is 
an “ends-means” process. 
 
 
The final choice of an alternative 
is dependent on how it contributes 
to the achievement of the goal.  
Decision quality is known only 
when it is shown that this decision 
provides the best means to the 
specified goal. 
 
 
 
When making individual decisions 
the process attempts to be 
exhaustive in the identification 
and selection of goals and the 
generation and evaluation of 
alternatives.  All factors are 
considered.  
 
Conscious attempts are made to 
integrate the decisions that 
compose the overall strategy to 
insure that they reinforce one 
another.  The strategy is viewed 
as a consciously developed, 
integrated whole. 
 
The process is initiated in response to 
a problem or dissatisfaction with the 
current state. 
 
 
The process is directed at achieving a 
modification of the current state.  The 
process is “remedial.”  
 
The remedial change outcome is 
considered at the same time the 
means for achieving it is analysed. 
The processes are intertwined and 
simultaneous.  
 
The final choice of an alternative is 
made by combining the considered 
alternatives (means) and their possible 
consequences (ends) and 
simultaneously selecting the one that 
yields the most desired outcome.  
Decision quality is judged by the 
agreement achieved in choosing an 
alternative (the means to the end) 
 
When making individual decisions the 
strategy considers only a few 
alternatives to the status quo as 
alternative actions and only a restricted 
range of consequences in their 
evaluation.  All possible factors are not 
considered. 
 
Little attempted is made to integrate, 
consciously, the individual decisions 
that could possibly affect one another.  
The strategy is viewed as a loosely 
linked group of decisions that are 
handled individually. 
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Table 7: Roles in the Strategic Process (Source: Floyd and Lane, 2000) 
 
 
Roles 
 
 
Behaviours 
 
Documenting Studies 
Top management  
Ratifying  
 
 
 
Recognising  
 
 
 
 
Directing  
 
Articulate strategic intent 
monitor 
Endorse and support 
 
Recognising strategic 
potential  
Set strategic direction  
Empower and enable 
 
Plan  
Deploy resources  
Command 
 
Hamel & Prahalad (1989)  
Burgelman (1983a) 
Hart (1992) 
 
Burgelman (1991) 
Mintzberg (1983) 
Hart (1992) 
 
 
Ansoff (1987) 
Schendel & Hofer (1979) 
Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984) 
 
Middle management  
Championing  
 
 
 
 
Synthesising  
 
 
 
 
 
Facilitating  
 
 
 
 
 
Implementing  
 
Nature and advocate  
Champion  
Present alternatives to top 
management  
 
Categorise issues 
Sell issues to top 
management 
Blend strategic and hands-on 
information synthesise  
 
Nourish adaptability and 
shelter activity 
Share information  
Guide adaptation  
Facilitate learning 
 
Implement  
Revise and adjust 
Motivate and inspire; coach 
 
Bower (1970) 
Burgelman, (1983a,b; 1991) 
Woolridge & Floyd (1990) 
 
 
Dutton & Jackson (1983) 
Dutton & Ashford (1993) 
Nonaka (1988) 
Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) 
 
 
Bower (1970) 
Mintzberg (1978) 
Chakravarthy (1992) 
Chakravarthy (1992) 
 
 
Schendel & Hofer (1979) 
Nutt (1987) 
Hart (1992); Quinn (1980) 
 
Operating management  
Experimenting  
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusting  
 
 
Conforming  
 
Learn and improve 
Link technical ability and 
need  
Initiate autonomous 
initiatives 
 
Experiment and take risks   
Respond to the challenge  
 
Be a good soldier  
Follow the system 
 
Argyris & Schón (1978) 
Burgelman (1983a,b) 
Burgelman (1991) 
Hart (1992) 
 
 
Hart (1992) 
 
 
Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984) 
Hart (1992) 
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